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The purpose of this paper is to re-examine Bakke, in light of the
challenges it has faced at the University of Michigan Law School and
undergraduate school. This paper will look at the obstacles universities
face in implementing the Bakke diversity rationale, and explore two
possible avenues for justification of using race-conscious admissions
measures. One justification for using race-conscious admissions policies
is to remedy past societal discrimination. Another justification provided
by the First Amendment may afford some protection to a university's
admissions policy if properly worded. Justice Powell announced that
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diversity is a compelling interest under the First Amendment.' This First
Amendment academic freedom has never been developed in the courts.
Instead, race-conscious admissions policies have been struck down on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. All of these discussions take place
through the lens of a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution.
I. IGNACIOUS AND REILLY2
Ignacious and Reilly are both sales representatives for the Pinkus Phar-
maceutical Company. For years, Ignacious has used particularly dirty tac-
tics to climb up the corporate ladder. Ignacious spared no one in his
climb to the top. He saw no problem with using unethical means to reach
a favorable standing in the eyes of his boss. Mr. Reilly embodies integ-
rity. He never resorts to the unscrupulous practices that skyrocketed
Ignacious to the top of the heap. The concept of cheating is not even
within the realm of acceptable behavior for Mr. Reilly. When the blind
Mr. Pinkus finally retired, he awarded his top salesman the privilege of
stepping into his shoes. Ignacious' promotion was bittersweet; on the one
hand, he was glad to have made it to the top, while on the other, he was
not proud of how he got there. To show his remorse, Ignacious enacted
new company rules that prohibited anyone from ever climbing up the
corporate ladder in a dishonest way. Reilly protests, claiming he was
robbed of the top spot by the thief Ignacious. Reilly wants Ignacious to
step down and anoint Reilly successor of the Pinkus Company. After all,
he did play honorably and according to the new standards. While
Ignacious sees the point, he does not exactly see eye-to-eye with Reilly
and is content that in the future such behavior will be eliminated.
Ignacious continues to benefit from his status, while Mr. Reilly continues
to struggle.
A similar question faces America in the educational arena. Should vic-
tims of ethnic groups that suffered discrimination at the hands of the fed-
eral government be given special consideration when applying for
admission to state-supported, higher educational institutions as a form of
reparation for the harm caused by the government? This is one question
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (writing that the
First Amendment gives universities the power to decide who they will teach). See U.S,
CONST. amend. I, which states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances."
2. The names for the characters of Ignacious and Reilly are taken from the name of
the title character in JoHN KENNEDY TOOLE, A CONFEDERACY OF DUNCeS (1980). This
book's unlikely hero, Ignacious J. Reilly, is not altogether unlike the fictitious Ignacious
used in this introduction.
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that the Eastern District of Michigan judiciary recently faced, where two
cases, using Bakke as a guiding light, arrived at different conclusions.
II. WHAT POSITION Do MINORITIES OCCUPY IN THE SOCIAL,
POLITICAL, AND EDUCATIONAL STRATA?
In 1988, Hispanics, Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans represented
27% of the total United States population.4 The Census Bureau projects
that by the year 2050, these groups will comprise about half of the U.S.
population.' In terms of education, Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Ameri-
cans experience educational disadvantages when compared to white chil-
dren.6 Asians and Caucasians are more likely to possess an education
beyond high school than their Hispanic and Black counterparts. In 1997,
9% of Caucasians and 15% of Asians held advanced degrees compared to
only 4% of Blacks and 3% of Hispanics.' Furthermore, Caucasians are
50% more likely to attain a four-year degree than Blacks and Hispanics
combined.9 In 1997, the percentage of Caucasians with Bachelor's de-
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (addressing the extent
to which race is a factor in the law school's admission decisions); see also Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819-21 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (discussing the justification of "race" as
a criterion in the admission process of a state university); cf. R. Richard Banks, Mer-
itocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C.
L. REv. 1029 (developing an argument for taking socioeconomic status into account,
thereby achieving the desired affect of racial redistribution). See generally Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; John H. Bunzel, Education Law and Policy: The
Diversity in Higher Education, 29 Fordham U.R.B. .J. 489 (declaring the difficulties with
which the schools and the courts have had in addressing affirmative action in higher educa-
tion); Ion Mills, Diversity in Law Schools: Where are We Headed in the Tweny-First Cen-
tury, 33 U. ToL L. REv. 119 (stating the importance of working towards balancing the
need for a diverse student body versus the law on diversity-based admissions).
4. CouNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE,
CHANGING AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING BY RACE
AND HIsPANIc ORIGIN 4 (1998).
5. Id.; see Census Finds 5 Big Cities in Ohio Smaller, N.Y. TnMEs, Mar. 17,2001, at A8;
A New Look at Race in the States, N.Y. Tirs, Mar. 20, 2001, at A18.
6. CouNcmI OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE oN RACE,
supra note 4, at 13.
7. Id. at 20. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions
Programs in Public Elementary and Secondary Scools, 112 HARv. L REv. 940 (1999)
(exploring the history of segregation and its impact on current educational opportunities).
8. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE,
supra note 4, at 20. See generally Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as a Com-
pelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARv. L REV. 1357 (1996) (highlighting the dis-
parity among the races in higher education).
9. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS FOR THE PREsIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE,
supra note 4, at 22. See generally Comment, Diversity as a Compelling State Interest in
Higher Education; Does Bakke Survive Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 79 OR. L. REv.
493 (2000) (showing the relationship between race and higher education).
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grees was 33%, in contrast to only 14% for Blacks and just 11% for His-
panics.1" These numbers are generally the same across the board in other
areas such as economic status, health, and housing.11
The bottom line in this country is that race and ethnicity are reasonable
indicators of wealth, health, and educational opportunities. 2 Is this the
same head start Ignacious gained over Reilly? There is a connection be-
tween our country's history of discrimination against African Americans
and disparities in wealth among the races. Slavery, Jim Crow, and dis-
carded governmental and societal views regarding minorities have left
their mark on today's distribution of wealth and political power.13 Given
the percentages, it is reasonable to ask whether compensating minority
groups for the effects of past societal, institutional, and judicially-ap-
proved discrimination is a compelling governmental interest, and whether
the use of quotas to reverse these effects will provide the narrowly tai-
lored means by which to effectuate this goal. The Fifth Circuit answered
these questions in the negative.' 4
III. HopwooD v. TEXAS - THE DECLINE OF BAKKE
In Hopwood v. Texas, 5 the Fifth Circuit invalidated a University of
Texas Law School admissions policy that gave weight to applicants from
10. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE,
supra note 4, at 22. See generally Pace Jefferson McConkie, Race and Higher Education: A
Rallying-Cry for Racial Justice and Equal Educational Opportunity, 21 U. ARK. LIrrLv
ROCK L. REV. 979 (1999) (discussing race and its impact on educational opportunities in
admission to college).
11. See generally ROBERT L. WOODSON, RACE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY (1989)
(explaining that race and economic success are closely linked); COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE, supra note 4.
12. See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON
RACE, supra note 4, at 2.
13. Tineen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining
the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 687
(1999) (citing Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, BLACK WEALTHfhVHITE WEALTH:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 12-13 (1995), which explains the connection
between wealth and race). Chisolm also asserts that "[tlo assume that the statistics reflect-
ing black and white inequities have no relation to past patterns of discrimination is to
accept an argument that these statistics reflect the true inherent abilities or disabilities of
African Americans. Id. at 688.
14. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). The court held that race may not
be used as a factor in admission in order to achieve a diverse student body. Id. at 962.
Despite any past discrimination a minority may have faced, the school may not admit mi-
norities based on using race as a factor for admission. Id.
15. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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minority backgrounds. 6 Cheryl Hopwood and three other white appli-
cants to the University of Texas Law School were denied admission and
sued the university under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 7 claiming impermissible racial discrimination by the law
school's admissions committee."8 Hopwood is a significant case in the
affirmative action landscape because it did not follow the Supreme
Court's ruling on the use of race in college admissions. 9 Hopwood
ushered in a new era of admissions policies at Texas universities, spawn-
ing the "Top 10% Law."'2  The three-judge panel, unable or unwilling to
find a consensus, in the Bakke opinion, refused to follow it.2 ' The Fifth
16. See id. at 935-38. This case has been pivotal in readdressing the use of race as a
factor in the college admissions process. See id. at 962. The court in Hopwood held that:
The University of Texas School of Law may not use race as a factor in deciding which
applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student body, to combat the per-
ceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school's
poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate any present effects of past
discrimination by actors other than the law school.
Id. at 962.
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
18. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. The University of Texas School of Law had various
measures in place, such as color-coding applications by race, to ensure that they maximized
their applicant pool for their objective of having a diverse student body. Id. at 938-39. See
generally Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999) (describing another attempt by a state univer-
sity to use race-conscious admissions to further its desire for a diverse student population).
19. Barbara Phillips Sullivan, The Gift of Hopwood. Diversity and the Fife and Dnm
March Back to the Nineteenth Century, 34 GA. L. Rnv. 291,294 (1999) (describing the Fifth
Circuit's criticism and condemnation of the consideration of racial diversity as contrary to
the Equal Protection Clause). See generally U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (containing the
Equal Protection Clause which is used in matters of race); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (citing the matter of race-based admissions for institutions of
higher learning).
20. See Gary M. Lavergne & Dr. Bruce Walker, Academic Performance and Persis-
tence of Top 10% Students: Academic Year 1999-2000 and Fall 2000, available at http://
www.utexas.edu/student/research/reportsadmissions/HB588-report3.html (last visited on
Feb. 16,2002). In response to Hopwood, the University of Texas at Austin implemented a
new admission scheme where the top ten percent of all high school students were automat-
ically granted admission. Id. The University of Texas at Austin is hoping that this measure
will encourage minority enrollment to its school. Id.
21. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962 (finding that a majority of the Justices in Bakke did not
agree with Powell's diversity rationale). In Bakke, six Justices filed opinions, none of
which garnered more than four votes (including the writer's). Id. at 944. The two major
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Circuit held that a majority of the Justices in Bakke did not join in Justice
Powell's part of the opinion that stated race could be used as a factor in
college admissions under the principle of academic freedom emanating
from the First Amendment.22 Instead, the Court cited City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co.,' a remedial Minority Business Utilization Plan case,
for the proposition that it is unconstitutional to correct an injustice to a
"Black man" by discriminating against someone who is White.24
The Court further cited Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena21 for the
proposition that contemporary equal protection jurisprudence recognizes
remedying the present effects of past racial discrimination as the sole
compelling governmental interest.26 This decision is especially remarka-
ble given the fact that one only needs to look fifty years back for evidence
of past discrimination at the University of Texas Law School.27 The Fifth
opinions - one opinion by Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun and the
other by Justice Stevens in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Steward
joined - reflected completely contrary views of the law. Id. at 941; cf. Bakke, 438 U.S. at
265 (writing opinions reflecting conflicting views).
22. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 (reasoning that such a view is not binding since no
other Justice joined in Powell's portion of the opinion discussing diversity); see also Mil-
waukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419,422 (7th Cir. 1991) (illuminating the
point that the government can only step in for the purpose of remedying discrimination
against minorities and not for the sake of diversity).
23. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (noting that the Minority Business Utilization Plan requires
contractors to subcontract at least 30% of each contract's dollar amount to businesses
owned by minorities).
24. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (stating the "standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is the same re-
gardless of the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification"); see also
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934-35.
25. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
26. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45 (pointing out that no case, other than Bakke, has ever
accepted diversity as a compelling state interest and that in fact, the Court has now re-
treated from the position); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (holding that "in an extreme
case, some form of narrowly tailored racial preference may be necessary to break down
patterns of deliberate exclusion). See generally Christopher Edley, Jr. & Dinesh D'Souza,
Affirmative Action Debate: Should Race-Based Affirmative Action be Abandoned as a Na-
tional Policy?, 60 ALB. L. Rnv. 425 (1996) (discussing the Hopwood decision in a debate
about the state of affirmative action and what the government can do); Symposium, Many
Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. Rnv.
429 (1998) (debating the issue of using corrective means to retard past and present
discrimination).
27. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (ordering Heman Sweatt, an African-
American, to be admitted to the all-White law school at The University of Texas largely
because the law school was funded by the state and also as a matter of Equal Protection
Clause compliance). More information concerning the man to break the color-barrier at
U.T. Law can be found at the University of Texas School of Law's Tarlton Law Library, as
well as information about the annual symposium held in his honor.
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Circuit's refusal to follow Bakke and the Supreme Court's official stance
with respect to race-conscious admissions is a logical extension of the
post-Bakke, color-blind jurisprudence surrounding affirmative action. 8
IV. DoCTmR AL FRAMEwoRK-BAsrc INFORMATION
AND BACKGROUND
What is racial discrimination? One of the difficulties in answering this
question is that today, this term carries with it many different meanings
and depending on one's political disposition, encompasses different situa-
tions. Black's Law Dictionary defines discrimination as "the effect of a
law or established practice that confers privileges on a certain class or
that denies privileges to a certain class because of race, age, sex, national-
ity, religion, or handicap."2 9 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits gov-
ernmental discrimination on the basis of race.3 The Supreme Court
refined this definition by requiring complainants to produce evidence of
discriminatory intent in Washington v. Davis.3
In Washington, minority applicants to the District of Columbia Police
Department were denied employment because of low personnel test
scores.32 They asserted that the police department's hiring and recruiting
28. Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31
U.S.F. L. REv. 757, 768 (1997) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopiwood is an
inevitable consequence of Powell's restrictive conception of remedial affirmative action);
Sullivan, supra note 19, at 296 (describing Powell's conception of diversity as
"problematic").
29. BLAcK's LAW DicroNARY 479 (7th ed. 1999).
30. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.; see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907-08 (1996) (discussing that the intended pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to prohibit race classifications by state govern-
ments); Croson, 488 U.S. at 491 (stating the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment is to limit
state governments' use of race-based classifications); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964) (stating the primary objective of the Fourteenth Amendment is to forbid racial
discrimination by state actors).
31. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239,245-46 (1976) (noting that a law is not
offensive to the Constitution merely because it disproportionately impacts an ethnic
group). But see Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-733 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board
of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2nd Cir. 1972).
32. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 232-33. A higher percentage of black than white ap-
plicants failed "Test 21," a civil service exam administered to all prospective governmental
employees. See id. at 235. The test is used throughout federal service and is not developed
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practices discriminated on the basis of race through a series of procedures
that included a written personnel test that excluded a disproportionate
number of African Americans.33 The rejected applicants asserted that
the police department violated their rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment 4 to the Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." 5
The applicants brought a Title VII suit alleging that the examination was
discriminatory because a disparate number of minorities were not being
hired on the basis of their test scores.36 The Court held that although a
disparate impact on a particular ethnic group is a factor to be considered,
disparate impact alone, without evidence of discriminatory purpose, does
not activate the strict scrutiny standard that is justified in only the rarest
of circumstances.37
Washington raised the standard required to show racial discrimination
by injecting an intentional element into the equation.38 Intent is an im-
portant element when examining the effects a particular governmental
by the police department. Id. It is "designed to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading,
and comprehension." Id.
33. Id. at 233. Two of the black officers who did not pass the test to become officers in
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, filed suit. Id. at 232. Respon-
dents sought declaratory judgment and an injunction for allegations that the tests were
racially discriminatory. Id.
34. U.S. CONsr. amend. V. The Due Process Clause states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Section 1981 of Title 42 states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Id.; see also Washington, 426 U.S. at 233-34 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and using constitu-
tional basis for review).
36. Washington, 426 U.S. at 233.
37. Id. at 242; see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 196 (1964) (writing
that an explicit racial classification in a criminal statute is suspect and calls for "the most
rigid scrutiny" and has a strong presumption of being unconstitutional).
38. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development, 429 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1977) (reiterating that discriminatory impact is not the only factor to be examined
when finding an official act unconstitutional); Washington, 426 U.S. at 239 (writing that a
disparate impact of a statute on a particular minority group does not automatically mean
that that statute is unconstitutional without evidence of discriminatory purpose).
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policy has on members of a minority group. Essentially, a law that is
facially neutral, but disparately impacts a particular minority group, car-
ries a presumption of validity under the Constitution.
Making matters worse for affirmative action proponents, the Supreme
Court rejected the assertion that a history of both private and public dis-
crimination justifies the use of a racial quota system designed to favor
minority business owners in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson CoY39 The
Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, held that the city failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest in reserving thirty percent of its con-
tracting opportunities to business owners on the basis of race.40 The
Court also noted that the wording of the policy41 was not narrowly tai-
lored to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. 42 Quoting Wy-
gant v. Jackson Board of Education4 3 the Court wrote, "[s]ocietal
discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy."4  A 1995 case, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,4 5 further eliminated the distinction between benign and invidious
discrimination.46
In Adarand, a construction company asserted that the federal govern-
ment's practice of rewarding general contractors for hiring subcontractors
run by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" violated the
Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
39. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
40. Id. at 505 (forecasting the evils that would occur in a society where race is irrele-
vant if the claim of past societal discrimination serves as the basis for racial preferences).
41. Id. at 477-78 (citing the original wording of the challenged ordinance that set aside
thirty percent of its business to Minority Business Enterprises controlled and owned by at
least fifty-one percent minority group members who are defined as U.S. citizens who are
Black, Spanish-speaking, Asian, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut).
42. See id. at 508 (reasoning that the over-inclusiveness of the statute would give suc-
cessful minorities an absolute advantage based solely on their race).
43. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
44. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98 (finding that the same defects in Wygant were present
in the instant case); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (describing
societal discrimination as an inadequate basis for racial preferences); see also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (writing that racial classifications in statutes are examined
under the most rigid scrutiny); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,191-92 (1964) (reason-
ing that statutes that have explicit racial categories subject themselves to rigid scrutiny
when examined by the judiciary); E. John Gregory, Comment, Diversity is a Value in Amer-
ican Higher Education But It is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action, 52 FLA. L
RExv. 929, 931-32 (2000) (explaining the Supreme Court's rejection of affirmative action
programs that merely address past societal discrimination).
45. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
46. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (writing that
holding benign racial classifications to a different standard is not compatible with the com-
mand of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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Clause.47 The Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause and Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause re-
quire a review of all racial classifications implemented by the federal,
state, or local government under a strict scrutiny standard.41 Strict scru-
tiny requires a racial classification to be narrowly tailored and must fur-
ther a compelling governmental interest.49
Before Adarand, the Court articulated the difference between a gov-
ernmental regulation meant to subjugate a minority group and a regula-
tion meant to help a minority group achieve equality under the law.50 In
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,51 the Court held that benign racial clas-
sifications were only subject to the less exacting intermediate scrutiny
standard and passed constitutional muster as long as they served impor-
tant governmental objectives and were substantially related to their
achievement.52
Thus, universities wishing to implement affirmative action admissions
policies cannot rely on the imprimatur of societal discrimination to justify
racially remedial measures.53 The use of explicit racial classifications
47. See id. at 204.
48. See id. at 227 (retreating from the concept in Metro that benign racial classifica-
tions meant to help minorities are subject to intermediate scrutiny and holding that the
Constitution does not tolerate racial classification of any kind, be they malignant or
benign).
49. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (asserting that racial classification
embedded in laws are constitutionally suspect and subject to strict scrutiny); Adarand, 515
U.S. at 227 (concluding that all racial classifications must satisfy strict scrutiny to survive
constitutional challenge); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (holding that classifications based on race, sex, or national origin will be reviewed
under strict scrutiny).
50. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 590 (1983) (writing
that Title VI did not forbid benign racial classifications and was consistent with the Consti-
tution); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (holding that it is not prohibited
when a nonminority firm is not awarded a contract as a result of the challenged statute
which was enacted to remedy the effects of past discrimination).
51. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
52. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 548-49 (1990) for a discussion
between racial classifications that are meant to help a minority group and those which are
meant to subjugate a minority group. The Court in Metro, using intermediate scrutiny,
held that a program designed to help minorities become owners of television and radio
stations was consistent with the equal protection principles of the Constitution under an
intermediate scrutiny standard. See id. It was concluded that diversity is an important
governmental objective. See id. at 596-97.
53. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989) (reiterating the pol-
icy that societal discrimination without a finding of discriminatory purpose is not a suffi-
cient justification for imposing a racially classified remedy); Wygant v, Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267,276 (1986) (holding that societal discrimination is too "amorphous" to
impose a racially classified remedy); see also Gregory, supra note 44, at 931-32 (explaining
that past societal discrimination is an inadequate basis for affirmative actions programs).
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favoring minorities must pass a strict scrutiny test.r4 Conversely, a
facially neutral admissions policy favoring "legacies""5 would pass consti-
tutional muster, absent a finding of discriminatory intent, because it is a
facially neutral policy despite the fact that minorities are disparately im-
pacted and the beneficiaries are predominately White.56 Both Croson
and Adarand relied on Regents of the University of California v. Bakke'
to invalidate the affirmative action policies that benefited minority busi-
ness owners.
5 8
V. BAKKE-THE GENESIS OF RACIAL DIVERSITY AS A COMPELLING
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
In Bakke, a white male denied admission to a state medical school chal-
lenged the legality of the school's admissions program that set aside six-
teen percent of its incoming class for minority students.5 9 The California
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the university's
race-based admissions program was unconstitutional under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and ordered Bakke admit-
ted into the medical school.' The university sought and was granted
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.6
1
54. See Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 547 (writing that explicit racial classifications are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (concluding that strict scrutiny applies to
all racial classifications); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (holding strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on race).
55. See Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, Note, Taking Account of Another Race: Refraining
Asian-American Challenges to Race-Conscious Admissions in Public Schools, 86 CoRNEL.
L. Rnv. 1283, 1299 (2001) (describing the policy of legacy admissions as favoring an appli-
cant because a family member is an alumnus).
56. See id. at 1299 (discussing college admissions programs that implement affirmative
action methods to compensate for historical discrimination against minorities are invali-
dated using a race-neutral analysis, while that same race-neutral analysis does not affect
other "plus categories" used in admissions decisions such as consideration of legacies, mu-
sicians, and the geographically diverse, all of which benefit a disproportionately white
population).
57. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
58. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218 (citing Bakke for the proposition that the concept of
equal protection must mean the same thing when applied to every race); Croson, 488 U.S.
at 493 (writing that racial classifications should only be used for remedial settings because
of the danger of stigmatic harm).
59. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265-66.
60. See generally Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976).
61. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976), cert. granted,
429 U.S. 1090 (1977) (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811).
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Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court and handed down
what would become the accepted rule of law for the next twenty years.62
At its core, Bakke stands for the proposition that achieving a diverse stu-
dent body qualifies as a compelling state interest that may be pursued
through the consideration of race as a factor in the admissions process.
That process must not, however, resort to the use of quotas.63 While
Powell's diversity rationale appears to settle the problem presented to
universities striving for a diverse student body, the reasoning accompa-
nied by the Court's solution is unstable, eventually melting clown and col-
lapsing when scrutinized by the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood decision.a
Bakke's meltdown is an inevitable consequence of applying Powell's
diversity rationale.65 Instead of grounding his solution in terms of racial
justice, Powell looked to the First Amendment 66 concept of academic
freedom 67 and held that attainment of a diverse student body is a consti-
tutionally acceptable goal for a university to achieve. 68 Academic free-
dom, while not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, has long been
regarded as a concern of the First Amendment and is derived from four
essential freedoms.69 Academic freedom gives a university the power to
select its professors, curriculum, methods of instruction, and student
62. See Charlotte Hawkins Johnson, Keeping the Door Open: The Fight to Keep Race-
Conscious Admissions in Higher Education, NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG., July-Aug. 2001, at 20
(stating that under Bakke, the settled rule of law regarding college admissions is that diver-
sity is a compelling state interest and race may be considered as one of the many factors).
63. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (ordering Bakke admitted to the U.C. Davis medical
program and vacating that portion of the opinion enjoining the university from ever con-
sidering race as one of many criteria for awarding admission); see also Johnson, supra note
62, at 20 (writing that under Bakke, the consideration of race as one of many factors to be
examined is permissible in the college admissions process).
64. See Sullivan, supra note 19, at 292-96 (criticizing Powell's take on diversity, first as
a vehicle to perpetuate whiie supremacy by encouraging the token assimilation of minori-
ties to enhance their education, and then as justifying the existence of gender segregated
institutions in the name of diversity in educational choice).
65. See id. at 295-96 (describing Powell's conception of diversity as "flawed"); see also
Lawrence, supra note 28, at 768-69 (arguing that Hopwood is the outcome of taking Pow-
ell's remedial affirmative action restriction to its logical extreme).
66. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
67. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's statement in Sweezy
v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) that universities must have the freedom to chose which
students should comprise the student body and to create an environment of speculation,
experiment, and creation).
68. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12, 320 (reversing the portion of the lower court's
judgment enjoining the University of California from ever considering race in a properly
devised admissions program).
69. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (citing Justice Frankfurter's conception of academic
freedom, which has a history of being afforded a special protection by the First
Amendment).
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body.7 ° By taking this route, Powell undermines the true spirit of any
affirmative action policy, which is to remedy society's racism and pro-
mote racial justice and equality.71 Even though it may hang in the bal-
ance, Bakke remains the Supreme Court's authoritative position on the
use of race-based admissions in higher education. 2
A comprehensive examination of the impact Bakke has on minority
admissions to law and medical schools has revealed that gains in this area
have been minimal. 7 It is possible that a more radical approach that
expressly endorses the use of race-based policies in college admissions
programs may yield a higher percentage of minorities admitted into col-
leges and universities.74 Instead, the First Amendment-based diversity
rationale, embraced by only one Justice, has been the subject of contro-
versy and litigation in the lower courts.75
In Bakke, at least four Justices agreed that race could be used as a
factor in the admission process under special circumstances.76 Powell ar-
ticulated the diversity rationale, but no other justice joined in that section
of the opinion.7 7 Thus, a challenge to interpreting Bakke arises from the
fact that Powell's diversity rationale, the central holding of the opinion, is
70. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (citing Justice Frankfurter's enumeration of the four
essential components of academic freedom in Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
71. Lawrence, supra note 28, at 765-69 (arguing the purpose of affirmative action is
not to achieve education diversity, a purpose which benefits white privilege, but rather its
true purpose is to promote equality among the races); Sullivan, supra note 19, at 298 (writ-
ing that the Powell diversity scheme undermines the true purpose of diversity, which is to
promote racial justice and equality, and arguing that diversity in Bakke enhanced First-
Amendment academic freedom and not racial equality).
72. Norman Redlich, "Out, Damned Spot; Out, I Say." The Persistence of Race in
American Law, 25 VT. L. Rnv. 475, 506 (2001) (describing Bakke as the Supreme Court's
stance on the use of race in college admissions).
73. See id. 506 (describing a study conducted by Susan Welch and John Gruhl that
found minority enrollment in law and medical schools since Bakke has only marginally
increased); see also Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke Matter? Affirmative Action
and Minority Enrollments in Medical and Lav Schools, 59 Otno ST. L.J. 697, 717 (1998)
(studying Bakke's effect on Hispanic and African-American enrollment in medical and law
schools).
74. Redlich, supra note 72, at 506-07 (writing on the failure of Bakke to produce
meaningful increases in minority enrollment in institutions of higher education).
75. See id
76. Philip T.K Daniel & Kyle Edward Tmken, The Rumors of My Death Have Been
Exaggerated Hopwood's Error in "Discarding" Bakke, 28 J.L & EDuc. 391, 396 (1999)
(concluding that Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun would have upheld the
benign discrimination as being remedial in nature and subject to the less exacting interme-
diate scrutiny standard).
77. Victor G. Rosenblum, Surveying the Current Legal Landscape for Affirmative Ac-
tion in Admissions, 27 J.C. & U.L 709, 710 (2001) (asserting that the portion of Powell's
opinion dealing with diversity was not joined by any of the other Justices).
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not embraced by a majority of Justices.7" With its numerous concurring
and dissenting opinions, Bakke has been subject to flexible interpreta-
tion.79 It is this flexibility that has left Bakke vulnerable to attacks, re-
suiting in inconsistent interpretations in the lower courts.8"
Justice Powell authored the deciding opinion that provided a middle
ground between two opposing pluralities."' Applying strict scrutiny, Jus-
tice Powell found that the attainment of a diverse student body was
clearly a constitutionally acceptable objective for an institution of higher
education. 2 He reasoned that a university's interest in diversity is a com-
pelling interest with respect to an admissions policy; however, he empha-
sized that diversity can only be one of many factors a university can use
to build a heterogeneous student body. 3
Remaining true to Bakke, while striking a constitutional balance be-
tween impermissible race-based quotas and acceptable consideration of
ethnicity, has been a challenge for lower courts and public universities
across the country. 4 As qualified white applicants have brought suit
against universities with affirmative action admissions policies, higher ed-
78. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 324, 379, 387, 402, 408. Justice Powell delivered the opinion
of the Court. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun each filed separate
opinions. Justice Stevens, concurred and dissented in part and filed an opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Rehnquist joined.
79. Redlich, supra note 72, at 506-07 (describing the lack of consensus among the
Justices in Bakke, which have left the diversity standard subject to differing meanings and
challenge in the lower courts).
80. See generally Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (arguing the
portion of Bakke is not controlling because it never garnered support from more than one
Justice); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (arguing that the
portion of Powell's opinion in Bakke dealing with diversity was not endorsed by any of the
other Justices and that subsequent Supreme Court cases such as Adarand and Croson ex-
plicitly foreclose the possibility of using racial classifications); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.
Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (agreeing that Bakke was still controlling law in the area of
college admissions); Johnson v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp.
1362, 1368-69 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (stating that Powell's opinion regarding the compelling na-
ture of student body diversity in university admission is not binding percent); see also Red-
lich, supra note 72, at 506-07 (writing that disagreement among the Justices in Bakke, have
attributed to the lack of uniformity in its interpretation).
81. Daniel & Timken, supra note 76, at 396-98 (describing the breakdown of the vari-
ous dissenting and concurring opinions).
82. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (holding that an admissions program, properly exe-
cuted, could constitutionally consider race as one of many factors in achieving a racially
diverse student body).
83. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-19 (describing a situation where race, depending on the
circumstances surrounding a particular student body and applicants for the incoming class,
may serve as a positive consideration for a given applicant).
84. Ann G. Sjoerdsma, Educational Diversity Under Attack, Rulings: Increasingly U.S.
Courts Reject Admission Plans, Inspired by the 1978 Bakke Case, as Unconstitutional Race
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ucation institutions have scrambled to accommodate both under-
represented minorities and qualified non-minority applicants within the
parameters set by Bakke.'5
In recent years, universities relying on Bakke to defend their race-
based admissions programs have found the diversity rationale skating on
thin ice. Many academic institutions have adopted or incorporated the
diversity concept into their educational mission.'8 Race-based admis-
sions policies relying on Bakke hang from the Constitution by a thread.
Each political and legal assault wrought by white plaintiffs who are de-
nied admission to institutions of higher education in the name of diversity
weaken the fragile holding in Bakke.
Do white plaintiffs have standing to assert that they are being excluded
from the higher education system on the basis of race? Even in colleges
where race-conscious admissions policies prevail, the majority of students
will still be White.' Going back to Ignacious and Reilly, Ignacious has
already secured the upper hand. Ignacious undoubtedly benefited from
his unfair tactics, and the same can be said for the people at the top of the
social and economic strata. While they are definitely not personally re-
sponsible for the mistreatment of racial minorities, they are undoubtedly
the beneficiaries of such discrimination whether they realize or agree
with that proposition. Like it or not, past subordinating schemes have
given Whites a "head start" at the best jobs, schools, and has created a
culture that privileges Whites.'
When a white person claims they are being excluded because of their
race, another way to frame that assertion is that because of their higher
GPA or test scores, their inclusion or admission is meritorious, as op-
posed to a minority with lower numerical qualifications. What if minori-
Discrimination, BALT. SUN, Mar. 26, 2000, at 1C (reviewing the climate in today's courts
with respect to the Bakke decision).
85. See generally Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932 (declining to follow Bakke); Gritter, 137 F.
Supp. 2d at 821 (declining to follow Bakke); Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 811 (following
Bakke); Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1368-69 (declining to follow Bakke).
86. Johnson, supra note 62, at 20 (stating that because of Bakke, many universities
have incorporated diversity statements into their mission); see also Daniel & Timken, supra
note 76, at 391-92 (stating that universities, relying on Bakke, have devised admissions
policies that consider race).
87. See Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke Matter? Afjirmative Action and Mi-
nority Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 697, 717 (1998) for an
explanation attributing increasing minority enrollments to a demographic shift in the Afri-
can-American population.
88. Roy L. BROOKS ET AL, CIVIL RIGH-Ts Lmo^'noN: CAss AND Pnspncrvns 13
(2d ed. 2000) (quoting Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L REv. 1707
(1993)).
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ties claimed exclusion on the basis of race? As discussed above, they
would have to prove an intentional element in the admissions practices.89
If universities use the merits of GPA and standardized test scores to
gauge admissions decisions in the light of evidence that in general minori-
ties do not perform as well as non-minorities on standardized exams, then
one may argue that these scores serve as a proxy for race.90 Although the
Supreme Court has addressed this issue in Washington v. Davis9 and
called for evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court has also departed
from this standard in cases dealing with racial gerrymandering, 91 where
plaintiffs do not have to prove discriminatory intent. 3 In the gerryman-
dering cases, the Supreme Court has taken the position that the districts
are so oddly and distinctively shaped that the need to prove discrimina-
tory intent is obviated. 94 Here the prima facie case was proved without
evidence of intent.95 Again, looking at the complainant, it becomes ap-
parent the white complainant has a lower burden to prove, while the mi-
nority complainant is held to a higher standard. This dual standard
perpetuates the status quo. Outcomes of challenges to majority
supremacy can be predicted based on the race of the plaintiff.96 White
plaintiffs have been successful in recent years challenging affirmative ac-
tion in university admission policies.97
89. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that a law is not offen-
sive to the Constitution merely because it disproportionately impacts an ethnic group).
90. See Steven A. Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 Micil. J. RACe
& L. 33, 35 (2001) (writing that college admissions procedures that evaluate applicants on
the basis of standardized tests are oppressive to minorities seeking to enter college).
91. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 239 (highlighting the notion of differences in stan-
dardized testing between black and white applicants).
92. See BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 696 (7th ed. 1999) for the following definition of
gerrymandering: "The practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often
of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the
opposition's voting strength." Id.
93. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-49 (1993) (departing from the standard that
disparate impact without evidence of legislative intent does not trigger strict scrutiny).
94. See id. at 647 (stating that appearances do matter in reapportionment, specifically
with regard to such factors as compactness, contiguity and consideration of political
subordinates).
95. See id. 643-49 (writing that strict scrutiny review will be applied to race-neutral
redistricting legislation where race provides the only possible explanation for their
enactment).
96. See e.g., id. at 630; McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington, 426 U.S.
at 229; Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d
821 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the
Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. Rnv. 928 (2001).
97. See Lawrence, supra note 96, at 933 (describing CIR's as instrumental in overturn-
ing affirmative action policies in both the university and governmental sectors). See gener-
ally Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932 (holding the University of Texas' admissions policy invalid
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The Center for Individual Rights (CIR) successfully extinguished the
University of Texas's right to use race in admissions decisions.9" In addi-
tion, CIR has filed similar complaints against the University of Washing-
ton Law School,99 helped defend a referendum in California ending
affirmative action in the public sector,1°° and today represents plaintiffs
in two cases challenging similar policies in place at the University of
Michigan's undergraduate and law schools."' CIR intends to pursue
these cases to the U.S. Supreme Court, where they believe the Bakke
opinion will be overruled. 2
VI. GPAaiz & GRurrER-To BE OR NOT TO BE?
The facts of two Eastern District cases are similar to those of Bakke. In
Gratz v. Bollinger, °3 a qualified white student denied undergraduate ad-
mission to the University of Michigan sued, claiming that policies prefer-
ring minority applicants violated her equal protection rights as well as
Title VI 4 Using Bakke as the basis for his opinion, Judge Duggan up-
held the use of race-based admissions as consistent with the requirements
when challenged by a white plaintiff); Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 821 (finding the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School's admissions policy unconstitutional).
98. Lawrence, supra note 96, at 933 (discussing the role of the CIR in the Hopvood
case). See generally Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932 (invalidating the university's use of race in its
admissions decisions).
99. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
university's race-conscious admissions program withstands the constitutional challenge and
does not violate Title VI).
100. Proposition 209, CAt- CONsT. art. I, § 31 states that "[t]he state shall not discrimi-
nate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting." Id. See generally Rachael F. Moran, Diversity and its
Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL L Rv. 2241 (2000)
(discussing the negative impact of Proposition 209 on minority enrollment at Boalt Hall).
101. See Lawrence, supra note 96, at 932-33 (describing CIR's active role in overturn-
ing affirmative action policies in various high-profile cases); see also D. Frank Vinik et al.,
Affirmative Action in College Admissions: Practical Advice to Public and Private Institit-
tions for Dealing with the Changing Landscape, 26 J.C. & U.L. 395, 396 (2000).
102. See Lawrence, supra note 96, at 933 (stating that the CIR believes the Supreme
Court will hold unconstitutional any consideration of race in the university admissions
context).
103. 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994). Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.; see Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811,
814 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
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of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 5 In ad-
dressing and declining to follow Hopwood, Judge Duggan criticized Hop-
wood's failure to use any precedent addressing the educational benefits
of a racially diverse student body as constituting a compelling govern-
mental interest and withstanding a strict scrutiny analysis.1°6 Instead,
Judge Duggan agreed with a concurring opinion in Hopwood which
stated the Supreme Court has never ruled out diversity in the student
body as a compelling governmental interest.1 07 Judge Duggan concludes
that Powell's diversity theory is the controlling rule of law relying on
Marks v. United States'0 which states, "[w]hen a fragmented court de-
cides a case and no single rationale enjoys the assent of five justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Mem-
bers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."' 109
In Grutter v. Bollinger,"° Barbara Grutter, a white plaintiff, claimed
that the University of Michigan Law School discriminated against her on
the basis of her race."' She asserted that her rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause were violated and that the law
105. See Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (finding that the current admissions program
where minority applicants are given a "plus" on account of race, but are not removed from
competition from the rest of the applicant pool, comports with the requirements set forth
in Bakke, and is accordingly constitutional). See generally U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1;
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
106. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 821-23; see also Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233
F.3d 1188, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000) (permitting the use of race to achieve diversity); Eisen-
berg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 130-31 (4th Cir. 1999) (leaving un-
resolved whether diversity is a compelling governmental interest); Boston's Children First
v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 258-59 (D. Mass. 1999) (rejecting the contention that
diversity can never qualify as a compelling governmental interest); Hunter v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1324-27 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (rejecting the idea that the
only interest that qualifies as being compelling is the remediation of past discrimination);
Rosenblum, supra note 77, at 732 (writing on Judge Duggan's criticism of Hopwood for not
basing its opinion on cases dealing with the benefits derived from an ethnically diverse
student body).
107. See Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 821 (agreeing with Judge Weiner's concurring opin-
ion in Hopwood that the Supreme Court has never unequivocally held that achieving di-
versity is not a legitimate compelling governmental interest); see also Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932, 964 (5th Cir. 1996) (Weiner, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority
decision which stated that the only valid compelling state interest is remedying past
discrimination).
108. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (instructing how to extract a
controlling rule of law in a plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 193 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)) (writing that the controlling rule of law in a plurality
opinion is the opinion decided upon on the narrowest grounds).
110. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
111. Id. at 823-24.
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school violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,11 which forbids the
recipients of federal funds from using race as grounds for
discrimination. 13
University of Michigan Law School's written admissions policy ex-
presses an intent "to admit a group of students that collectively and indi-
vidually are among the most capable students applying to American law
schools in a given year... we seek a mix of students with varying back-
grounds ... who will respect and learn from each other." '114 The policy
further states that in addition to the traditional indicators of law school
success, LSAT, and undergraduate grade point averages (UGPA), "com-
mitment to racial and ethnic diversity... with special reference to the
inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discrimi-
nated against... ." will be considered."' In defense of this policy, the
law school states that, "these students are likely to have experiences and
perspectives of special importance to our mission... ensuring their abil-
ity to make unique contributions to the character of the law school.""1 6
Both Grutter and Gratz have substantially the same facts, Bakke guides
both opinions, and yet the district judges in each case arrive at different
conclusions. 117
The Grutter opinion rejects the application of Marks, reasoning that it
applies only in situations where the opinions differ slightly." 8 Further-
more, the Grutter court reasons that the concurring opinion's silence re-
garding the diversity rationale is an implicit rejection of that line of
reasoning. 1 9 Both responses to Powell's opinion are plausible; however,
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994). The Civil Rights Act states, "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
113. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 824; see also 42 U.S.C § 2000(d) (1994) (stating the
prohibition of using race to discriminate against recipient's federal funds).
114. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (quoting directly from the law school's admissions
policy).
115. Id. at 826-27 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
116. Id. at 827-28 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
117. Mary Anne Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of
the Religion Clauses?, 2000 Sup. Or. REv. 325,331-32 (2001) (describing the struggle in the
lower courts to reconcile the use of affirmative action in college admissions with the Bakke
opinion).
118. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (reasoning that the Marks test was inapplica-
ble because the varying positions of Justice Powell's diversity rationale and Justice
Brenann's remedial rationale could not be compared for "narrowness").
119. See id. at 846 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (noting that the clearest indication that Justices
Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Marshall disagreed with the diversity rationale is evi-
denced by not joining in that part of the opinion).
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
the persuasiveness of either response comes into question when examin-
ing the actual analysis of the issues in the opinion.
In Gratz, Judge Duggan affirms the use of race by applying a contex-
tual analysis of the legal issues and their effect on social and economic
interests. 2 ° This approach to interpreting the Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment is closely aligned to legal realism, where several factors are
taken into account in interpreting the Constitution, including the eco-
nomic impact and actual motivation driving both the admissions scheme
and the Fourteenth Amendment.121 Hopwood v. Texas122 is a decision
that Duggan does not ignore in his opinion and he easily distinguishes
it."2 In Hopwood, the court justified their conclusion by reasoning that
the concurring opinion's silence in Bakke, with respect to Powell's diver-
sity argument, implied their rejection of that rationale. 24
Nevertheless, the same silence in the Gratz court's analysis just as eas-
ily implies approval. 2  Additionally, Judge Duggan relies on an array of
data from experts to show the academic and societal benefits gained by
both the institution and its students where admissions policies foster di-
versity.126 According to the opinion, there is consensus among the 360
120. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (reiterat-
ing that diversity in the context of higher education justifies the use of race as one factor in
the admissions process).
121. GEOFFREY R. STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 194-95 (Richard Epstein, et al.
eds., 3rd ed. 1996) (describing both the legal formalism and legal realism approaches with
regard to interpretation of the commerce clause); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prose-
cutors, Race Defenders, 89 GEo. L.J. 2227, 2229-30 (2001) (recognizing lgal realism as a
mechanism to revise law).
122. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
123. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 821 (criticizing the Fifth Circuit for basing its analysis
on a case dealing with minority business set aside programs and not within the higher
education context which implicates the "uneasy marriage of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments").
124. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 (stating the four Justice plurality comprised of Justices
Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Marshall, implicitly rejected Powell's poition).
125. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 820 (noting that "the panel in Hopwood reads too
much into the other Justice's silence regarding Justice Powell's diversity rationale").
126. See Albert M. Camarillo, Expert Report, Reports Submitted on Behalf of the Uni-
versity of Michigan: The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MIcH. J.
RACE & L. 339 (1999); Eric Foner, Expert Report, Reports Submitted on Behalf of the
University of Michigan: The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MicH. J.
RACE & L. 264 (1999); Patricia Gurin, Expert Report, Reports Submitted on Behalf of the
University of Michigan: The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MIcH. J.
RACE & L. 363 (1999); Claude M. Steele, Expert Report, Reports Submitted on Behalf of
the University of Michigan: The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5
MICH. J. RACE & L. 439 (1999); Thomas J. Sugrue, Expert Report, Reports Submitted on
Behalf of the University of Michigan: The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Educa-
tion, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1999).
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institutions, represented by the Association of American Law Schools,
that the quality of education for all students is enriched when student
bodies include persons of varied ethnic and racial backgrounds.
127
In contrast, the Grutter court endorses the Hopwood panel's rejection
of Bakke and deems the admissions policy unconstitutional. 128 To
counter the negative effects that may occur in the face of discrimination,
unconstitutional race classifications must yield to lawful solutions that
treat all people alike regardless of the color of their skin.129
The Grutter court adopts a color-blind formalistic equal protection
analysis and reasons: if there are racial preferences built into the admis-
sions policy, they are unconstitutional.13 A formalistic approach favors a
narrow interpretive discretion so that interpretations are limited to the
discovery of fact and rules of law.131 The Grutter court offers no insight
into the problem facing universities struggling to maintain a diverse stu-
dent body.'32 The Grutter court dismisses defendant's evidence support-
ing the diversity rationale, distinguishes viewpoint diversity from racial
diversity, and rejects the possibility that the two could be connected. 33
127. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (noting that "over 360 institutions represented by
the Association of American Law Schools assert that they have learned through their ex-
tensive experiences ... that the quality of education for all students is enhanced when
student bodies include persons of diverse backgrounds").
128. See Rosenblum, supra note 77, at 733.
129. See id. at 734 (offering solutions including de-emphasis of LSAT scores, under-
graduate GPA, and elimination of legacy preferences); see also William C. Kidder, Com-
ment, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational
Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite" College Students, 89 CAL. L Rnv. 1055,
1062-63 (2001) (suggesting decreasing emphasis on LSAT scores in law school admissions
because of disparate impact on minority groups). See generally Banks, supra note 3, at
1029 (defending class-based college admissions from merit and racial diversity critique).
130. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 848.49 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (reading
both Adarand and Croson to hold racial classifications as unconstitutional unless they rem-
edy carefully documented past discrimination).
131. See GEOFFREY R STONE, CONSTrrTIONAL LAw 194-95 (Richard Epstein et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1996) (describing both the legal formalism and legal realism approaches with
regard to interpretation of the commerce clause); see also Alfieri, supra note 121, at 2229-
30 (describing legal realism as a mechanism to revise law).
132. See generally Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 821 (suggesting that universities could
simply eliminate reliance on LSAT scores, undergraduate GPA's, and special considera-
tions given to the alumni of the law school to achieve a diverse student body, however, the
court does not offer advice on evaluating the overall quality of applicants without using
traditional indicators of law school success).
133. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 849. The court states, "[t]he connection between
race and viewpoint is tenuous, at best. The defendants walk a fine line in simultaneously
arguing that one's viewpoints are not determined by one's race but that certain viewpoints
might not be voiced if students of particular races are not admitted in significant numbers."
Id.
2002]
THE SCHOLAR
In Dred Scott v. Sandford,' the Supreme Court, through Justice Ta-
ney, stated that the framers of the U.S. Constitution believed that African
Americans were "beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to asso-
ciate with the White race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to re-
spect."' 35 Taney's hands seem to be tied with respect to the issue he an-
nounced, yet some traces of empathy, irrespective of its sincerity, can be
read in the opinion.' 36 In a move reminiscent of Taney's Dred Scott opin-
ion, the Grutter court acknowledges and sympathizes with the position it
rejects by acknowledging the educational and societal benefits derived
from a racially diverse student body, while rejecting those benefits as
compelling because they are not remedial in nature. 137 The Court throws
the blame at the minorities for not performing as well as their Caucasian
counterparts on the LSAT.' 31 Shifting the blame, however, fails to ac-
count for disparities that arise from differences in socialization, testing
bias, and unavailability of adequate preparatory resources1 39
Friedman's opinion in Grutter rejects the use of quotas in admissions
policies pursuant to Bakke, while implying that a narrow tailoring can
only be achieved by allowing the use of quotas, which is unconstitu-
tional.140 If a university wants to pursue a goal of diversity in its student
body, then a race-neutral policy is the least efficient way to achieve that
goal.1 4 1 The use of race-conscious measures would be the most efficient
134. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
135. Id. at 407.
136. See id. at 405 (writing that it is not the duty of the Court to decide the justice or
injustice of a law).
137. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50 (writing that although it is undisputed that
racial diversity provides both educational and societal benefits, the fact remains that racial
diversity is not a compelling state interest under Bakke).
138. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 866-67 (holding that racial biases in content or
design of the LSAT have not been proven).
139. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (rejecting the explanation that disparities in
LSAT scores can be explained by language difficulties encountered by students for whom
English is a second language; the court also discounts a possibilities that minorities are less
likely to afford or be aware of LSAT preparatory courses).
140. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 867-68 (writing that the research presented at
court did not address racial hostility to other minority groups such as Arab or Eastern
European students, thus reasoning that the "narrow focus" of the research presented do
not help admissions officers determine which applicants deserve a "boost").
141. Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHio ST. L.J. 1039, 1054
(1998) (stating that "it would seem perverse, as a matter of constitutional law, that a per-
missible goal be sought by the least efficient alternative means"); see also K.G. Jan Pillal,
Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 HASrINGS CoNT. L.Q. 89, 94 (1999) (noting
that "Texas' race-neutral policy happens to be the least efficient means of achieving that
goal").
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and narrowly tailored way to achieve that goal.'4 2 Yet, the use of race is
only permissible for a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored
to achieve that purpose. 43 The narrowest way of achieving the goal of
diversity, however, is through the use of quotas, which are unconstitu-
tional under Bakke.'" Friedman also objects to the exclusion of other
groups who have suffered historical discrimination.145 Implicit in Fried-
man's reasoning is that the group should be expanded to include any
group that has been historically discriminated against.146 Nevertheless,
expanding the protected group to include other ethnic groups without
regard to their need for protection would not satisfy strict scrutiny's re-
quirement of a narrowly tailored means to achieve an end in which the
government has a compelling interest.147
142. Pillai, supra note 141, at 94 (pointing out that a university would want to promote
racial diversity in the most efficient manner possible and that race-neutral mechanisms will
not produce the desired goal); see also Sullivan, supra note 141, at 1054 (questioning why
any university should be compelled to use race-neutral policies when those policies pro-
mote racial diversity as effectively).
143. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (stating that
strict scrutiny ensures that "courts will consistently give racial classifications ... detailed
examination both as to ends and as to means"); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 940 (5th
Cir. 1996) (stating that strict scrutiny must be used to evaluate all racial classifications);
Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (articulating the strict scrutiny states which states that con-
sideration of race is only permissible if it is used to further a compelling governmental
interest and its use is narrowly tailored to meet that demand).
144. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,301 (1978) (holding that
racial quotas are forbidden by the Constitution); see also Sullivan, supra note 141, at 1054
(writing that race neutral admissions policies are the least efficient way to achieve
diversity).
145. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (pointing out that the inclusion of specific minori-
ties such as African Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans
to the exclusion of other minorities such as Arabs, Southern, and Eastern Europeans is
unprincipled).
146. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 850-52 (objecting to the non-inclusion of other
underrepresented minorities in the university's admissions policy).
147. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,506-08 (1989) (discussing
the arbitrary inclusion of racial groups not in need of remedial relief does not satisfy the
narrowly tailored means requirement of strict scrutiny); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 n.13 (1986) (discussing the overinclusion of all minorities groups
does not meet the narrowly tailored means of strict scrutiny); Hon. H. Lee Sarokin et al.,
Has Affirmative Action Been Negated? A Closer Look at Public Employment, 37 SAN DI-
EGo L. REv. 575, 583 (2000) (discussing Justice Powell's decision in Wygant).
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VII. EMERGING DOCrRINES-THE OBSTACLE CREATED BY A COLOR-
BLIND INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Justice Harlan first articulated his utopian ideal of what the law should
be in his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent. 4 ' Although a dissenting opinion,
Justice Harlan's powerful concept has gained prominence and emerged as
a powerful weapon for attacking remedial efforts seeking to eradicate the
continuing repercussions of discrimination against minority groups.1 49
Does a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution recognize the reality
that this nation gave special treatment based on race for many decades
under protection of the law?150
Thurgood Marshall recognized the unfairness of a philosophy that fore-
closes the possibility of recovery from the very injustices its absence cre-
ated."' Had the Supreme Court adopted the color-blind scheme in
Plessy v. Ferguson and not created the "separate but equal" doctrine, the
need for affirmative action would not exist. 5 Additionally, the Equal
Protection Clause was adopted to provide constitutional protection
against state action perpetuating the mistreatment of African Americans
after the Civil War. 53 The United States Constitution was not originally
drafted as a color-blind document.'" It authorized a difference between
Caucasians and African Americans and did not afford to minorities any
of the protectiois associated with a color-blind document.' 55 The truth
is, for nearly a century after the Civil War, the law of the American South
148. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896).
149. Darlene C. Goring, Private Problem, Public Solution: Affirmative Action in the
21st Century, 33 AKRON L. REv. 209, 210-11 (2000) (describing the origins of the color-
blind rhetoric and its impact on affirmative action programs). See generally DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994); Wooden
v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Ga. 1999); DeR-
onde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 625 P.2d. 220 (Cal. 1981).
150. Goring, supra note 149, at 245-46 (describing Justice Marshall's opposition to a
color-blind interpretation of the Constitution).
151. See id. at 246-47 (2000) (describing Marshall's criticism of the majority's interpre-
tation of Plessy).
152. See Marco Portales, Hopwood, Race, Bakke and the Constitution, 4 Tx. Hism,
J.L. & POL'Y 29, 29-30 (1998) (discussing how the failure of Equal Protection Clause to
provide equal educational opportunities prevented a preponderance of minority citizens
from achieving a higher class status and they now comprise America's underclass).
153. See Goring, supra note 149, at 246-47.
154. See Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color-Blind Constitution, 54 WAsH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMp. L. 157, 198-99 (1998) (discussing the irony of adopting a color-blind
reading of the Constitution when it was never envisioned by the framers as a color-blind
document).
155. See id. at 198-99 (1998) (stating that the framers of the Constitution viewed
Eighteenth Century America in terms of black, white, yellow, and red, and thus intention-
ally denied citizenship to every race except White).
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was segregation. 56 Today, skin color continues to matter with respect to
traffic stops, airport security, border checkpoints, and immigration law. 157
Is it possible to achieve racial equality without recognizing the fact that
the dominance of white males in government, education, and economic
status was achieved by artificial means? Could it be possible that the only
way to dismantle this artificially constructed hierarchy is to employ laws
that differentiate between the races to help minorities, rather than hinder
them? Consider the following:
To love is to suffer. To avoid suffering, one must not love. But then
one suffers from not loving. Therefore to love is to suffer, not to
love is to suffer, to suffer is to suffer. To be happy is to love, to be
happy then is to suffer, but, suffering makes one unhappy, therefore
to be unhappy one must love, or love to suffer, or suffer from too
much happiness ....8
At least one legal scholar would agree with Woody Allen. Professor
Alienikoff writes in A Case for Race-Consciousness, "color blindness sup-
ports racial discrimination.., to end racial oppression our political and
moral discourse must move from colorblindness to color-conscious-
ness."'159 The color-blind interpretation of the Constitution is an instance
of putting the horse before the cart. Race-conscious measures are
needed until society evolves to a point where racial differences no longer
play a role.16° As noted above, the current trend in constitutional juris-
prudence is to anoint the Constitution as a color-blind document. How-
ever valiant that proclamation may ring, the reality is that the American
legal system is not prepared to fully embrace that principle. The color-
blind interpretation of the Constitution, for all of its laudable intent, is an
obstacle in the struggle for racial equality.161
The very mechanisms the government used to eradicate racial discrimi-
nation against minority groups are now being used to tear down their
156. Erwin Chemerinsky, What Would Be the Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Ac-
tion?, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 313, 313-14 (1997) (discussing the effects of Jim Crow
laws on African Americans following the Civil War).
157. Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 Aui. L REv. 703,704-
05 (2000) (describing the use of race-conscious traffic stops).
158. Love AND DEATH (United Artists 1975) (quoting Woody Allen).
159. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L REa.
1060, 1062 (1991).
160. See Ilhyung Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Scholars, 33 CoN. L Rnv.
535,545 (2001) (explaining Aleinikoff's rationale for advocating race-conscious measures).
161. See id. at 542 (2001) (quoting professor Aleinikoff's belief that it is impossible to
achieve racial equality without first considering race).
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creation.' 62 Schools that once opposed desegregation and were forced to
comply with Court decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education 63 are
now fighting to justify their affirmative action policies to the very courts
that mandated compliance.' 4
When a white person challenges a policy or governmental action under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the result is often an invalidation of that law
as an impermissible race distinction, regardless of whether that policy
helps rather than hinders minorities. 65 Historically, when a minority
challenges a law or policy on a similar basis, the courts have found either
that the race or gender-based distinction serves a compelling governmen-
tal interest or a lack of discriminatory intent is enough to sustain the pol-
icy.166 Having to prove discriminatory intent virtually guarantees a
failure of that challenge. Discrimination is so ingrained in American cul-
ture, lawmakers are often unaware of the disparate impact a particular
policy may have on minority groups.' 6 7 Charles Lawrence argues that
most discrimination today is the result of unconscious forces, and absent
invidious intent, it is beyond the pale of constitutional prohibition.168
Moreover, in the post-Brown v. Board of Education era, blatant dis-
crimination has succumbed to a politically correct, facially neutral dis-
crimination. An area of the law at odds with the color-blind
interpretation of the Constitution is criminal law enforcement. The ques-
162. See Chisolm, supra note 13, at 680 (describing how the laws designed to end
segregation are now being used to resegregate).
163. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring that "sepa-
rate but equal" violates the equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
164. See Adam Cohen et al., Coloring the Campus, It's Like the 1960's in Reverse: The
Schools are Trying to Integrate and the Courts Won't Let Them, TIME, Sept. 17,2001, availa-
ble at 2001 WL 22575077 (describing the reversal of roles in the segregation debate).
165. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich.
2001).
166. See generally Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998) (holding that a white
defendant has standing to challenge exclusion of black jurors based on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down a
redistricting plan as impermissible gerrymandering); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)
(striking down a redistricting plan that created majority black voting districts in an action
brought by five white voters); Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (holding the association has stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of an ordinance preferring minority business owners),
167. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322, 330 (1987).
168. See generally i
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tion then becomes, "who is the intended beneficiary of the color-blind
Constitution?"
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,169 Justice Powell announced that
race is a factor to be considered in automobile stops. 7 ' Yet the Four-
teenth Amendment does not allow a stop where the only basis for suspi-
cion is an occupant's apparent ancestry.171 The Supreme Court's decision
in Bakke is consistent with the rule announced in Brignoni-Ponce.17 2 In
both Brignoni-Ponce's highway stops and Bakke's university admissions,
race may be used as one of many factors in evaluating an applicant's ac-
ceptance or in deciding whether to stop and search someone.173 Al-
though the condemnation of racial profiling has received vide support,
race continues to be an essential component when describing suspects.
74
The inconsistency of allowing race to be a factor in racial profiling while
prohibiting consideration of race in college admissions does not make any
sense. What this really says is that the government will only allow the use
of race when it serves a purpose that helps the government, but not when
it can be used to help minorities.
A result of racial profiling is that there are greater incidences of police
scrutiny if one is African American or Hispanic."75 The disparate impact
of law enforcement practices is traceable from the point of arrest to pros-
ecution and conviction.' 76 A recent report reveals that in the past
169. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
170. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 873 (1975) (holding that border
patrols suspecting persons only because of their Mexican ancestry violated the Fourth
Amendment).
171. See generally id. at 873 (holding that race may be one of many factors considered
in determining whether to stop someone).
172. Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: Driving While Mexican and Affirmative Ac-
tion, 6 Mic. J. RAcE & L. 195, 203 (2000) (stating that both Brignoni-Ponce and Bakke
clearly shows race's relevance).
173. See also id. at 197 (suggesting that while race should not be a factor in traffic
stops, it should be a factor in affirmative action because of the power differentials between
the races). See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 US. at 873.
174. See R Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Pro-
tection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L Rav. 1075, 1077 (2001) (arguing that race-
based descriptions of suspects play a prominent and overlooked role in most publicized
controversies); see also Bryonn Bain, Walking While Black- The Bill of Rights for Black
Men, VILLAGE VoicE, Apr. 26, 2000, at 43 (detailing the arrest of a black Harvard Law
School student of a crime he did not commit).
175. Maria V. Morris, Comment, Racial Profiling and International Human Rights
Law: Illegal Discrimination in the United States, 15 EMORY INt'L L Rc-v. 207, 210 (2001)
(discussing how international human rights law is violated daily in the United States with
the practice of racial profiling and its discriminatory impact effects millions of minorities).
176. See generally David Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Dis-
crimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of its Prevention, Detection, and
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twenty-five years, the death penalty has been imposed on crimes involv-
ing white victims in 85% of cases, despite the fact that African Americans
are victims of homicide in at least 50% of all cases. 177
Who is most likely to challenge the constitutionality of the administra-
tion of the death penalty on equal protection grounds? In Bakke, Hop-
wood, Grutter, and Gratz, the plaintiffs were White. In McCleskey v.
Kemp,17 the Supreme Court rejected an African American's Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claim on the grounds that he failed to es-
tablish the requisite discriminatory intent.179 The defendant provided ev-
idence that proved murder defendants with white victims were at least
four times as likely to receive the death penalty in contrast to defendants
with black victims.180
It is inconceivable that a white defendant would sue the government
because the death penalty has a disparate impact on his race. One could
almost imagine the arguments produced in such a suit. "Your honor, my
client contends that the denial of the death penalty to my client violates
his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, he de-
mands to be treated just like one of his minority colleagues and sentenced
to death." It is an interesting scenario, but not likely to occur.
VIII. A PROTECrION OF DIVERSITY BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Bakke, Justice Powell announced that "attainment of a diverse stu-
dent body is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
learning" emanating from the protections afforded the First Amendment;
therefore, a university is protected in its judgments as to educational pol-
Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359,365-66 (1994) (discussing the disparities existing
between white and black persons accused of violent crime); Morris, supra note 175, at 207
(discussing the impact of racial profiling on African Americans and Hispanics).
177. K.G. Jan Pillai, Shrinking Domdin of Invidious Intent, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RrS.
J. 525, 551 (2001) (describing how the doctrine of invidious intent has crippled the Equal
Protection Clause's ability to protect claims in disparate impact in capital sentencing). See
generally Baldus, supra note 176, at 359 (discussing the problem of racial discrimination in
capital sentencing).
178. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
179. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-93 (stating a defendant must establish "the existence
of purposeful discrimination" to successfully prove an equal protection violation); see also
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (reit-
erating the principle that discriminatory intent is required to sustain an Equal Protection
violation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that a racially discrimi-
natory purpose is a necessary element to prove a successful Equal Protection violation).
180. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287 (citing to a statistical study performed by Profes-
sor David C. Baldus et al., commonly known as the Baldus study); see also Pillal, supra
note 177, at 551 (describing the inapplicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to claims of
racial discrimination in the capital sentencing context).
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icy including the selection of its student body.'' If we take this view,
then what happens when governmental action interferes with the message
articulated in an organization's mission statement?
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,an the Court upheld the Boy Scouts'
categorical exclusion of homosexuals based on their mission statement,
which expresses the organization's intent that their Scouts lead "morally
straight lives."'1 a The Court stated the forced inclusion of a person in a
group interferes with that group's First Amendment freedom of expres-
sive association when that person's presence significantly affects that
group's ability to advocate their viewpoint.1i 3 An injunction forcing the
Scouts to reinstate Dale, an affirmed homosexual, was deemed to be an
impermissible infringement on the Scouts' right of intimate associa-
tion."' Taking this reasoning a bit further, it is also true then that the
forced exclusion of a wanted person in a group interferes with their abil-
ity to advocate viewpoints, be they public or private."
As mentioned above, most public universities have included the attain-
ment of a diverse student body in its mission statement in compliance
with Bakke."8 What happens when governmental action suppresses the
message a race-conscious admission policy has on its student population
and pedagogical practices? When a court invalidates a university's race-
conscious admissions policy directly contradicting a published mission
statement, they are restricting that university's ability to achieve the aim
of their mission statement, a result directly at odds with Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America.'
181. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12; see also Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 243, 263 (1957)
(writing that the concept of academic freedom is actually made up of four essential free-
doms which include a university's right to determine "who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted for study").
182. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
183. Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. at 649. All scouts must take a Scout Oath which
among other things states that the scout will remain mentally awake and morally straight.
See id.
184. Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. at 648 (writing that forced inclusion of a person
interferes with a group's ability to advocate its public or private views); see also New York
State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (writing that a local law
does not significantly affect that groups ability to advocate its viewpoint).
185. 530 U.S. 640, 655-56 (2000).
186. But cf. Boys Scout of America, 530 U.S. at 648 (holding that a forced inclusion of
an unwanted person in a group may impair that group's freedom of expensive association,
thus diminishing their ability to advocate their viewpoints).
187. Johnson, supra note 62, at 20 (stating that Bakke has provided the motivation for
many universities incorporating diversity statements into their mission statement); see also
Daniel & Timken, supra note 76, at 391-92 (stating that Bakke allowed universities to de-
velop admissions policies that consider race).
188. See Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. at 648.
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Using Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, a university could claim in retort
to an anti-affirmative action suit that the exclusion of minorities in signifi-
cant numbers significantly alters their message, especially in connection
with a stated diversity mission statement. Theoretically, the university
would thus be entitled to deference for purposes of the claim that forced
exclusion of minorities violates their right of expressive association. 189 It
is well established that the First Amendment protects expression without
regard for the popularity of its content.1 9 While affirmative action is
unpopular among some in the current legal landscape, is that reason
enough for government action to silence the message of diversity?
IX. TORT THEORY AND REMEDIAL RACE-CONSCIOUS
ADMISSIONS POLICIES
Tort law and affirmative action policies share common threads of legal
fabric: "loss and compensation, rights and responsibilities, fairness and
justice as well as the basic doctrine of causation." 91 Both theories oper-
ate on the basic presumption that it is fair to compensate the victim for
intentional harm." Affirmative action gained currency in the late sixties
and seventies as a result of the Civil Rights movement. Educational insti-
tutions adopted programs that went beyond prohibition of discriminatory
practices, introducing numerous remedial measures such as race con-
scious monitoring and preferences.193 As Justice Andrews observed in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,194 the proximate causation requirement is
not a rigid rule to be applied in a mechanical manner, but a rule that is
often tempered by forces outside logic and the law. 95 "What we do
mean by the word 'proximate' is that because of convenience, of public
189. See id. at 651-52 (2000) (writing that publication of a group's viewpoint is evi-
dence that the viewpoint exists).
190. Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. at 659; see, e.g. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (protecting flag burning of the U.S. flag); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(protecting the Klu Klux Klan's call for unlawfulness as a mechanism for achieving politi-
cal reform).
191. Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79
TEx. L. REv. 643, 644 (2001).
192. Id. at 644 (drawing similarities between tort law and affirmative action and iden-
tifying their common concern for compensating injury).
193. Id. at 648-49 (showing how public entities instituted outreach, goals, preferences,
and set-asides).
194. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
195. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928); see Mari J. Mat-
suda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical-Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. Rvv.
323, 375-384 (1987) for a discussion on the similarities between tort and affirmative action
jurisprudence and a suggestion that causation requirements should be relaxed for more
egregious intentional torts.
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policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a
series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical
politics."' 96 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, may have
agreed. In Bakke, they equated the Title VI prohibitions with an adapta-
ble Equal Protection Clause 97 and determined that benign discrimina-
tion for the purpose of remediation should only warrant intermediate,
rather than strict scrutiny.198 The causation rule is what sets affirmative
action remedies apart from tort remedies, resulting in the beneficiaries of
the affirmative action remedies not necessarily being the people who
were discriminated against, but rather their descendants.' 99 The key is to
emphasize the lingering effects of the past discrimination.
The lingering effects of segregation and slavery include continuing dis-
parities in wealth, education, and political power?' ° A look at the racial
composition of governments at the state and national levels reveal with
which racial group the political power lies. There is no doubt that Whites
continue to have a stranglehold on political power. The power to chal-
lenge is closely tied to this relationship.
A pattern has emerged in cases challenging race-conscious affirmative
action policies of educational institutions. Plaintiffs not benefited by the
policy are able to bring suit, asserting a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.1° ' The university must show that
discriminatory conduct in the past caused the lingering effects observed
196. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
197. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
198. Daniel & Tmken, supra note 76, at 396 (describing the Brennan plurality in
Bakke, which would have permitted the admissions policy); see also Lee Epstein & Jack
Knight, Piercing the Veik Willian J. Brennan's Account of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 19 YALi L. & Por'y REV. 341 (2001) (revealing Justice Brennan's
notes and personal feeling on the 1978 Bakke opinion).
199. Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Las, 68 U. CoLo. L REv. 841,
848 (1997).
200. Chisolm, supra note 13 at, 687-91.
201. Adams, supra note 191, at 650-51. See generally Eisenberg v. Montgomery
County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding Montgomery County's use of race
in its transfer program as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that Boston's Latin
School's consideration of race as an admissions factor was inconsistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
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in the present.202 This onerous burden virtually guarantees the success of
plaintiffs in reverse discrimination cases and forces universities to defend
their policies based on the shaky diversity rationale.
A recent New York Times/CBS Poll revealed that Blacks and Whites
agree on the following: laws are still needed to protect minorities from
discrimination, racial diversity is an important governmental goal, and
programs that advance minorities are acceptable.20 3 However, a majority
of Americans polled still reject making hiring and admissions decisions
based on race.2" These numbers reflect a trend in American constitu-
tional jurisprudence towards a race-neutral or color-blind interpretation
of the Constitution.
X. CONCLUSION
Getting back to Ignacious and Reilly, is it sufficient that Ignacious pro-
hibit further dishonesty in the workplace without compensating Mr.
Reilly? Although the means of governmental discrimination against mi-
norities have been dismantled, the harm caused has yet to be eradicated.
Justice Harlan wrote that there comes a time when the past victim of
discrimination ceases to be a favorite of the laws and becomes an ordi-
nary citizen.20 5 Although we are beginning to dismantle affirmative ac-
tion policies on this premise, the time to abandon them has not yet come.
Discarding affirmative action before its time will perpetuate and forever
seal the fate of America's minority groups as citizens who continue to
occupy the lower educational and economic ranks of our country.
The bottom line in the two Michigan cases is that no matter which way
the Sixth Circuit decides, someone will lose. One side will suffer at the
expense of the other. A qualified non-minority will lose an opportunity
to enroll in the school of her choice or an underrepresented minority will
not have the opportunity to break through the barriers imposed by white
males who seek to maintain their preferred status as leaders of the pack.
White males, to further ensure their status as superior, privileged mem-
bers of society established American institutions of higher learning.
There is a long history of discrimination against minorities, especially in
our nation's educational history. Disparities exist in all levels of educa-
202. Adams, supra note 191, at 651 (2001) (discussing that the plaintiff must establish
that at an earlier point he was discriminated against because of his race).
203. Martin D. Carcieri, Operational Need, Political Reality, and Liberal Democracy:
Two Suggested Amendments to Proposition 209-Based Reforms, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
459, 460 (1999).
204. Id. at 461 (describing the tension between the seemingly compatible goals eradi-
cating the present effects of past discrimination and eliminating consideration of race in
making hiring and admissions decisions).
205. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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tion. The cycle begins in early education where funds are allocated to
school districts by virtue of their location. Generally, the neighborhoods
with the most money get the best education.2° Caucasians live in neigh-
borhoods that benefit most from this allocation of funds?' The artificial
creation of diversity in institutions of higher learning is needed to disman-
tie these barriers and break the pattern that began with the creation of
our educational system. A balancing of the harm to each group should be
considered when deciding this appeal. Since both sides lose in the above
scenario, it makes more sense to err on the side of party who has suffered
the most. For the most part, members of all minority groups have suf-
fered past societal discrimination in the context of disparate educational
opportunities and should benefit from the use of quotas in institutions of
higher learning until evidence that artificial creation of diversified student
bodies is no longer necessary. Evidence that quotas are no longer needed
is present when under-represented groups perform on par with their
over-represented counterparts.
206. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO.
WAsH. L REv. 587, 621-22 (1993) (writing that schools in affluent neighborhoods receive
superior resources while schools in poorer neighborhoods are inadequately funded).
207. See Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized Legal Racism: Housing, Segregation and Be-
yond, 11 B.U. IN-' LJ. 35, 49-50 (2001) (stating that the white affluent population enjoy
better schools and housing compared to poorer suburbs where minorities live).
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